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Abstract. The discussion about a difference between brain and soul or mind is now 
at the center of the anthropological debate. It seems that the pioneers in this current 
polemic have a reductionistic view of human nature, inherited from the Cartesian solu-
tion to mind-body problem and the modern materialistic explanation of reality. This 
view – dualistic or monistic – about the opposition between material and immaterial 
structure of the person, claims that as a consequence of scientific progress, the human 
brain in the future could be completely explained in naturalistic terms. On the other 
hand, according to the new results of scientific research, this situation reveals the 
possibility to develop a new, more adequate paradigm of man as an incarnated person. 
This change was called by many researchers “the passage from the mind-body problem 
to the person-body problem”. It seems that the Aristotelian-Thomistic approach is the 
most suitable to describe this “paradigm shift”. Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy un-
doubtedly encourages lively dialogue between philosophy and contemporary sciences 
through its dual ontology. Thus, it can give suitable answers for questions about the 
nature of human reason (intentionality); unity of composition of the human brain and 
the role of causality in natural processes.
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Introduction
In the area of questions about humans it has always been taken into the ac-
count the important reflection about the nature of the world that surrounds 
us. But in modern times, that is especially after the scientific revolution, 
which was largely caused by Copernicus’ theory and Galileo’s scientific 
method, the attention of the natural sciences in the following centuries 
increasingly began to focus on the topics of man’s place in the whole puzzle 
of the universe. It seems that the twentieth century, marked by the difficult 
experiences of humanity, such as totalitarianism, different wars, galloping 
consumerism, and economics killing the poorest, confirms that, more or 
less consciously, humanity was focused on the role, structure, and sense of 
man. In other words, the domain of questions about humanity in some way 
shifted from the “macro universe” to the “micro universe”. How can this be 
justified? E.g. the tremendous progress of biotechnology, research on the 
DNA and on the human brain. The best-funded areas of scientific research 
are precisely the experiments on stem cells, human embryos, research on 
neurons or artificial intelligence. Thus, the rapid entry of technology into 
the field of human existence demands a particular philosophical reflection. 
What is need is a broad view of the nature of human existence. Thus, there 
is an urgent need to discuss the problem of the human person.
This article will present and discuss issues which were brought up in the 
article of Woźniak (2014). The author presents his main ideas on the basis 
of the research performed by M. Cortez (2010) and J. Searle (1994, 2004). He 
explains the theology of imago Dei in terms of rationality and the freedom 
of the man, which are grounded in the specific biological structures, which 
cannot be explained merely by biology. However, at the same time this cannot 
be explained by theologians as a merely spiritual dimension. On the one hand 
Woźniak demands rethinking traditional ideas of the imago Dei (the concept 
of the man being created in the image of God), the idea of the different 
types of causality (theological and physical) and a broader articulation of 
the material character of nature. But on the other hand Woźniak claims that 
there is need of a new approach that will be able to mediate between the 
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ontological monism and dualism which means, according to him, can be 
called “the moderate monism” (Woźniak 2014, 280). This article will be an 
attempt to show how thanks to the combination of Aristotelian-Thomistic 
philosophy with new scientific results, we can rethink the concept of matter 
and the human corporeal being with a dual approach.
1. The limits and shift of paradigm: from the mind-body  
to the person-body problem
In the twenty-first century the idea of the scientific progress is most 
probably not shocking for us. In the modern era, when the results of 
mathematical-empirical method were really spectacular, it was normal to 
assume that the absoluteness of scientific results. But already in philosoph-
ical field, Kant’s thesis were broadly questioned by Hegelian metaphysics 
and a strong arguments against the pure formality of human cognition 
were put forth by F. Brentano and E. Husserl. Hegel proposed the tenant 
that historical conditions determine human existence. This idea was later 
reinterpreted in merely scientific view by the positivistic movement. But 
F. Brentano and E. Husserl work caused the renewal of the discussion about 
human intentionality. Since the Galilean times, as explained A. Koyré (1980; 
160, 163, 167), modern science was strongly connected with neo-Platonic 
metaphysics. It claimed that the distinction between metaphysics and 
science has not been properly demarcated. Thus, modern science made 
the passage from the cognitio certa per causas to the cognitio certa per leggis 
(Maritain 1974, 44–45) that in Newton’s research meant to attribute the 
apodictic character of cognition through physical laws (Newton 1704, 326). 
But in the near future, the physics of the Newtonian-Laplace model was 
questioned by a series of physical discoveries: statistical thermodynamics 
of Boltzmann; inherent instability of the dynamic systems with more 
than two bodies (demonstrated in the work of H. Poincaré); the quantum 
physics (W. Heisenberg); the relativistic physics (A. Einstein) and nonlinear 
dynamics and thermodynamics of the so-called complex physical systems 
(Basti 1991, 35–43).
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1.1. Antinomies, axiomatization of the philosophical logic  
and intentional paradigm
The separation between the cognition through causes, essences (according 
to antic philosophy of nature) and the apodictic-mathematical method 
prepared the conceptual background for the future axiomatization of mathe-
matics (mathematics as the formal theory distinguished from interpretations 
– different models). On the one hand, the birth of non-Euclidean geometries 
clearly demonstrated that the mathematical theories and its interpretations 
“incarnated” in the physical theories have a hypothetical character. But on 
the other hand, axiomatization, which began with the discovery of Riemann 
and ended with failure of Hilbert’s program, revealed, thanks to works of 
G. Cantor and Russell, the syntactical (and not only semantic) character 
of logic antinomies explained in K. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 
arithmetic. In other words, the antinomies discovered in the fundaments 
of the mathematics had the metaphysical character. The hidden sense of 
this antinomy consisted in the lack of adequate distinction between the 
notions of “essence” (a set of properties and relationships that determine 
a subject) and “being” (existence of the subject which is a fundament of 
metaphysical properties and relations). From linguistic point of view, this 
implies the insufficiency of the “expressive power” of the univocal language 
and calls for the need of the theory of analogy, since ordinary languages have 
unavoidable semantic dimensions and ordinary experiences are intrinsically 
intentional (Basti 2007, 193–201).
The typical for above mentioned functionalist approach is the Kantian 
interpretation of the cognitive act in the terms of representative character. 
In this view, human cognition stabilizes the functional correspondence be-
tween things external to the brain (the state of objects) and the mental state 
that was caused by activation of the neural circuits. According to Fodor’s 
work (1980) the dispositional states activated in the neural networks form 
the propositional attitudes, symbols of the language of thought. Even then 
J. Fodor (2001, 2008) was trying to avoid the representative consequences 
of his approach, although in fact, in the functionalist approach based on 
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the extensional logic the brain exhibits only a passive work in order to 
stabilize the equation between the internal and external state. Thus, the 
task for biological and cultural evolution is to stabilize the basic symbols 
and categories between externally perceived human reality and human 
thought. Although Fodor’s contribute is essential to the birth of cognitive 
science, the inevitable epistemological limit of this discipline is contained 
to the use of extensional logic. A functionalist approach is not sufficient for 
the explanation of the intentional character of the human cognition and 
the different types of human reasoning that are not only computing data 
but also inventing (Basti 2009, 191–194).
This shift of the paradigm in logic is linked to the aforementioned idea of 
axiomatization, not only in the mathematics but also in logic. Thanks to the 
work Principia mathematica (1910–1913) of A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell, 
the idea of axiomatization of mathematical logic (extensional logic) could 
be realized. But the application of this type of logic to the whole of human 
culture, according to the Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and 
its diffusion by neopositivism movement and analytic philosophy, caused 
the reduction of the scope of philosophical language. Because extensional 
logics (first of all mathematical logic) are based on the so-called axiom 
of extensionality: “Given any set A and any set B, if A is a nonempty set 
(that is, if there exists a member X of A), then if A and B have precisely the 
same members, then they are equal”. From this logic we find a ground for 
the empiricist dogma, that the mental and physical states are equivalent 
(isomorphic). But already in 1912 the American logician C.I. Lewis (1912) 
revealed the limits of the concept of logic included in Principia and explained 
philosophical logic using the idea of axiomatization rather than reducing it 
to mathematics. But in reality, his Symbolic Logic published in 1932 can be 
considered as the first text of modal logic axiomatization. As with works of 
Frege, Whitehead, Russell began the axiomatization of extensional logic (that 
prescind different semantics). It was C.I. Lewis who started the shift and the 
beginning of very important work on axiomatization of intensional logic 
(ontic, deontic, epistemic). This logic differs from the previous one firstly due 
to the use of diverse semantic interpretations (senses) of notion of necessity 
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and secondly because of the sense given to the notion of the predication 
(different criteria of the truth that depends necessarily from the truth and 
false of proposition’s components) (Basti 2012, 31–47). In the light of this 
logical works, but also thanks to the contribution of neopositivistic formal 
analysis of intensional statements, the theory of identity (so-called empiricst 
dogma and dogma of AI) was disproved in its strong version. The intentional 
statements are used by the subject to express own conscious mental states 
(I-talk) and they have the form always referred to some content (e.g. I like/
want/see/think something). They are distinguished from the statements 
of the outside observer (O-talk) in which are expressed the statements of 
neurophysiological description of mental states. The first one are expressed 
in the intensional logic, the second one are necessary expressed in the 
extensional logic and both are mutually irreducible (Basti 2009, 203–210). 
J. Searle made a further critique of the functionalist approach and its use 
of mathematical logic questioning it as the unique synonym of rationality. 
He stressed that the intentional character of human cognition implies use 
of intensional logic although he did not choose this approach for his future 
researches (Searle 1980; 1983; 2007). To conclude, the mind-body problem 
is before the ontological, it is situated on the logical level (irreducibility of 
I-talk and O-talk). The ontological and logical component of the discussed 
problem call for a consistent theory of information and application of these 
notions and measurements in cognitive and biological systems (Basti 2005, 
172; paragraph 1.2.).
There are strong links between the representative approach in episte-
mology, the cognitive sciences and anthropological monism. In the case of 
materialistic monism, the mind is reduced to the collection of the mental 
states produced inside some of the parts of the body – specifically in the 
brain. As Basti (2009) rightly observes, through the modern contributions 
of Descartes, Hume, Kant and Frege’s logic, the extensional interpretation 
of logic and the supposition of the identity between physical and mental 
state of mind dominated the discourse about mind-body problem. But in 
recent years there can be seen a shift from the representative/functionalist 
approach based on the extensional logic to the intentional approach based 
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on the intensional logic. The technological progress, called “research for the 
third informatics revolution” (Web 3.0), consists in use of logical calculus 
based on the principles of modal and intensional logics. The Web 3.0 could 
be called “the intelligent Web” because the coming third generation of 
Internet-based services, which emphasize machine-facilitated understanding 
of information, appeal to the intuitions and experiences of the human users. 
In this context, intensional logic is not only non-extensional but also as 
the logic of discovery (inductive and not only deductive). Thanks to the 
recovery of intensional logics it is possible to make progress in simulating 
human behavior in what the research of new generation of robots is called 
formal ontology engineering. In other words, in actual technology, through 
use of formal ontology, the role of human intentionality is recuperated. In 
the context of a representative approach, extensional logic (but also the 
intensional logic that does not analyze human actions) cannot exceed the 
semantic and syntactic analysis and cannot expand its research domain over 
human language or the state of human consciousness. From the formal point 
of view, the classic problem of reference remains unsolvable from within 
this approach. However, the problem of extralinguistic reference is solvable 
within the causal theory of reference (Donnellan 1966; Putnam 1975). This 
theory is linked with the turning point in H. Putnam’s scientific research 
(Putnam 1960) – the shift from functionalist theory to intentionality (Putnam 
1988) – and is linked to the works of Kaplan (1978) and Kripke (1980). The 
reason for this shift is that the representative paradigm does not provide 
any possibility to establish cognitive realism. The intentional paradigm 
prioritizes human action preeminence over the representation. This pas-
sage (thanks to the formal ontology that takes account simultaneously of 
all three classes of relations – pragmatics, syntax, semantics) means that 
the representative moment (syntactic-semantic) of human cognition is 
the function of intentional moment (pragmatic) where the representation 
depends on the causal action to/from the subject from/to the cognized real 
object (Basti 2007, 204–208; 2009, 206–210; 2015, 115–120; Salmon 2005; 
Cocchiarella 2007).
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Basti (2009, 194) explains that typical for the intentional approach is to 
have as a paradigm not the sense of sight (Platonic view) but the sense of 
touch (Aristotelian view). Through touch one is acquainted with the con-
sequence of human action. The motor action of body, as the reorganization 
of internal dispositions, constitutes the real cognitive moment in complex 
intentional act. In the Aristotelian approach this act is not interpreted as 
static internal representation of external conditions but means continuous, 
active and adaptive self-modification (imminent action) of dispositional states 
of the brain (habit) from/to the environment in the reciprocal control, with 
dispositional states of whole organism, in view of the actual achievement 
of the purposes. Thus the intentional act is not the act only of the brain 
or mind but is executed by the whole body, by the person. The truth is 
not considered as the static representative equality (aequatio) but as the 
dynamical, continuous adequacy (ad-aequatio) of our dispositions to action 
(cognitive habits). It means that our mind or brain not only calculates on 
the basis of a priori symbols (sets, classes and its functional relations) but 
is constituting and progressively making adequacy between the logical 
symbols and the objects at which those symbols are referred and redefined 
in the base of the relation with the subject’s aims. In other words describes 
this particular character of logic of our minds W. Freeman (2001, 120–121):
This description, whether he [Merleau-Ponty] intended it to or not, clearly 
conforms to Aquinas’s process of assimilation, by which the brain learns about 
an object by making itself similar in selected aspects to the object through 
organization of the body and neuron throughout the brain. He appears to 
make a distinction between the horizon of the world outside and the horizon 
of perception within. […] The act of perception transcends the two horizons 
through assimilation. Our perception of an object has already been conceived 
before the sensory input, by the action taken to obtain the input. The structuring 
is done by repeated cycles of action and perception that Merleau-Ponty calls 
the intentional arc, which constitutes the effort to achieve maximum grip. His 
putting each detail within the perceptual horizon essentially means positioning 
the sensory receptors through efference and focusing the sensory cortices 
through preafference, which is to pay attention in order to achieve optimal 
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assimilation of the self to an object. The self adapts to that object and learns 
about by shaping the body, and also by reshaping or repositioning the object. 
A familiar example is manipulating a new tool with our fingers, squeezing it, 
inspecting its facets visually, listening to the sound it makes when it is tapped, 
and then applying it to other objects as we conceive and configure them.
To sum up, the logic of our minds is not the logic of merely calculation but 
of continuous adaptation. The shift from the representative-static paradigm 
to the intentional-dynamic was ultimately decreed by the series of cognitive 
and neurophysiological evidences accumulated in the last years (Basti 2009, 
195–197; Basti 2014, 226–231):
1. The collection of many years’ explorations expressed in the work 
of A. Damasio (1994) showed the neurophysiological importance 
of the human emotions. He proved that patients with defects in the 
emotional area of the brain were unable to make decisions favorable 
for themselves and acceptable by the social environment. The work 
of Damasio revealed the error of Cartesian res cogitans (and of Kant) 
to separate the ethics from the emotional sphere. In this recent 
work (2010) he discussed the distinction between the conscious-
ness, self-consciousness and observable behavior. In this view the 
author developed the idea that the mind should not be understood 
like the Cartesian vision of the mind in the body, but on the contrary, 
working as a controller over the body which the mind “contains”. 
Damasio’s works can be considered as opening the discussion about 
the intentional interpretation in the cognitive neuroscience.
2. In the neural network there does not exist a separation between the 
learning and recognition phase. The neural network is in continuous 
learning/recognition phase.
3. Activation of the neural circuits during the same behavior effects the 
activation of the same brain area but always with different neural 
circuits activated. Thus, in cognition and neurological circuiting, the 
same input give different responses/replies.
4. The single neurons codify over time the different input over time, as 
evidenced by the contribution of Hubel and Wiesel research on the 
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simple and complex cells and on the development of the visual sys-
tem, which involved a description of the ocular dominance columns.
5. In the functionalist approach, it was hypothesized that there is rigid 
functional distinction between the sensory, association and motor 
cortex. But the discovery of the mirror neurons and studies based on 
them (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2006) demonstrated the omnipresence 
of the motor neurons that codify not single movements but coordi-
nated movements.
6. On the basis of the instability (point 2) and non-stationarity (point 3) 
of brain dynamics, it can be concluded that its physical character can 
be described in the terms of chaos theory. This was the conclusion 
of the Freeman’s group (paragraph 1.3). This would mean that brain 
memorization is dynamic. Memorization means reactivate the com-
plex dynamic between the system of neurons of the limbic sub-cor-
tex area and a network of neurons from the sensorimotor cortex. 
These last neurons are always different but they are activated to 
reproduce the same global effect of intentional assimilation which 
is on the base of that memory.
1.2. Towards the theory of information
In order to understand the discovery of Freeman’s group it is necessary to 
explicate fundaments of the informational interpretation of the quantum 
physics in its two versions: quantum mechanics (QM) and quantum field 
theory (QFT). This interpretation is closely related to the research on the 
issue of the information performed by Basti (2012, 47–71). Basti gives the 
intuitive definition of information as the relation of the order of the parts 
that could have been ordered in another way. As it will be demonstrated 
after, this definition corresponds to Aristotelian notion of the form. But 
this preliminary definition can also be understood in correspondence 
to the scientific notion of information – in mathematics related to the 
notion of improbability (in mathematical physics this notion is linked to 
the statistical notion of the entropy) and in logics related to the notion 
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of the undecidability. The application of the notion of the information in 
the field of physics, mathematics and logic justify the use of its another 
definition: “the physical measurable but immaterial quantity” (Wheeler 
1990, 75). In modern times our philosophical intuition has been influenced 
by the dualistic view of reality. This means that the notion of form or formal 
cause are often interpreted as some kind of immaterial efficient cause. The 
dualistic and Cartesian vision strongly influenced the researches about the 
mind-body problem where the explanation of the action of the soul often 
meant the competition between the biological forces of the body and the 
possible impact of the soul on the body. On the one hand, the reduction 
of the physical causality only to the causal action and, on the other hand, 
totally misunderstanding the real significance of formal cause, resulted in 
the absurdity of many philosophical discussions. Otherwise, these defini-
tions of information can be metaphysically explained in the dual ontology 
through the notion of the form (act, determination) and the matter (potency, 
indetermination). In the Aristotelian view, the form depends on the causal 
foundation that comes from the action of an efficient cause on the unde-
termined substrate. The different order of efficient causes can determine 
totally different effects. In other words, to product some effect, the set of 
efficient and material causes is not sufficient, as there is also the necessity 
of its order, its form.
The first who introduced the idea that physical entities are ultimately 
constituted from the energy and information was J.A. Wheeler (1992). The 
idea of the information as the physical quantity has been in recent years 
broadly discussed in the camp of fundamental physics. In this camp two main 
ontologies dominate the notion of information: naturalistic and conceptual. 
The second is defined by Basti (2016, 5–6) as an intellectual exercise, but 
the first one provides the ontic notion of information. This means that 
within naturalistic ontology, the information is considered as the physical 
quantity, distinct from the matter (mass-energy) in which it is placed. The 
most important results from this approach can be summed up in the works 
of P. Davies (2010), P. Benioff and G. Smoot. Firstly, the ontic definition 
of the information questions the strong connection of modern science 
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with the neo-Platonic metaphysics of logical realism. In the naturalistic 
approach the mathematical laws of physics and their evolution are based 
on the evolution of the universe, because there is mutual determination 
between the mathematical laws and the physical processes. The principle 
of this approach is named computational coarse graining (Perrone 1995; 
Basti & Perrone & et al. 1995; 1996). Secondly, the studies on entropy and 
on the inflation of the universe revealed that the gravitational force can be 
interpreted as the entropic force that generates information. The works of 
S. Hawking and J. Bekenstein showed the possible measurement of entropy 
that can be associated to a black hole (Hawking radiation). Through the works 
of G. ‘tHooft and L. Susskind this idea was applied to the string theory of 
physics and to the event horizon enclosing the expanding universe, defined 
as the principle of the holographic universe. The increase of the physical 
confirmations about the strict correlation between gravitation, thermody-
namics and information allow us to say that the past states of the universe 
contain causally, but not logically, the future states of its evolution. Hence 
a mechanism of actual information growth is required because the growth of 
the information is connected with the area of the event horizon containing 
the universe. This interpretation can be called as “the causal origin” of the 
information in the key of the naturalistic ontology (Basti 2016, 7–8). This 
mechanism does not mean that the quantity of the information is already 
written in the cosmological horizon. Rather it is written in the causal factors 
which are able to generate it. These ideas find the correlative explanations 
in the Aristotelian’s concept of educing the form from the matter (section 3) 
and in the Aristotelian theory of the natural place. This last idea was based 
on the Aristotelian thermodynamic concept of physics where the spread 
of heat upwards signs the anisotropic character of the physical space. As 
a consequence, the Aristotelian celestial spheres built from the special 
element (aether) and the eternal and unchanging bodies (lightest and more 
ordinated), are said to be the cause of the terrestrial, irregular events. It can 
be claimed that the celestial spheres had the same ontological function as 
the event horizon of the holographic cosmology. Thirdly, this cosmological 
interpretation of the information has its continuation in the biology research 
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based on the informational approach. This approach is linked to epigenetics 
and to the anthropological vision which is capable of recovering the dual 
approach in the anthropology and the notion of the psychophysical unity of 
the person (Basti 2014, 240–247). From the 1960’s when modern genetics, 
based on the already mentioned progress of the program of AI, was developing 
the inquiry of the human DNA, the idea of the Aristotelian form has found its 
own place in biology and psychology and was interpreted under the notion 
of information incorporated in the brain’s or organism’s interchange of 
matter-energy. The grate “skip” in the biological field has happened in recent 
years and is linked with the progress of the epigenetics. This study, in the 
field of genetics and phenotypic trait variations, clearly shows that variations 
are caused by external or environmental factors (biochemical signals) that 
ordinate the changes in gene expression in absolutely individual way. Hence, 
as it was conceived by the founder of the epigenetics C.H. Waddington, the 
embryonic development depends not only on the genome but also on the 
epigenetics. On the other hand, the dual approach in biology strictly depends 
on the physical foundation expressed in the language of QFT.
1.3. Quantum field theory and chaotic systems –  
towards the dissipative QFT approach
The starting point of the QFT approach is the evidence that for every 
physical reality underlies a field of irreducible forces – the vacuum state. 
This constitutes the common substratum of each physical reality and has its 
corresponding notion in Aristotelian the raw material – the indeterminate 
matter. QFT provides the opportunity to understand the missing link in 
the biochemical processes. As Basti underlines (2014, 240–250) the vital 
functions, at its fundamental level, are the ordinated and coherent sequence 
of the chemical reactions. But these reactions do not depend only on the 
chemical factors working well in short distances but also depend on the 
factors that are organizing its movement, especially in the long distances. 
This theory shows the explanation that the efficient way to organize the 
casual processes of the molecules consists in putting their characteristic 
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oscillation, which depend on the quantum laws, under the influence of the 
electromagnetic fields that are oscillating with the similar frequencies. 
This means that in the heart of biological interpretation of QFT we find 
the thesis that each biological function is constituted by the ordinated 
frequency of chemical reactions. This dynamical principle of the control 
of the reactions (fine tuning) means that the electromagnetic field which 
is in resonance with the appropriate frequency of the biomolecules, closes 
them and the chemical reaction could be done. In this light it can be said 
that QFT may in the future provide more accurate and mathematically 
defined explanation of emergence processes, more adequate than the 
proofs offered by Popper’s (1977) and M. Bunge’s ideas (1980). In QFT, 
the emergence of the macroscopic characteristic (the structure and the 
functions) is given through the dynamic process which determinates the 
arrangement of the system. Hence the quantum properties (the quantum 
entanglement, non-locality, discretization of space and time, the dual 
nature – energy and information – of every physical process) are not only 
limited to the microscopic level but there is clear macroscopic evidence in, 
e.g. the ferrous materials, the laser, the superconductivity of some mate-
rials, the self-organization of the organic molecules in vital and cognitive 
processes. In brief, the emergency properties depend on the way in which 
the oscillations of the fields associated to the component molecules are 
organized. Thus the dynamical process is the process of the increase of 
information because the dynamical correlation means the symmetry breaking 
and the emergence property are really new properties not reducible to 
the properties of the fundamental components or to the sum of them. 
In the QFT, the correlation between the force fields is propagated by the 
Goldstone bosons (the quantum of correlation). In the difference to other 
bosons (gluons, photons, W+-, Z and Higgs boson) they are not mediators 
of energy (matter) but mediators of modality of the interactions between 
different force fields. In other words, they are not the quantum of the energy 
but the quantum of the correlation/information. Hence, on the basis of the 
Goldstone’s theorem, when the ordinated state of objects loses its property, 
by virtue of the first law of thermodynamics, the energy and correspond-
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ing quantum are preserved, but the ordinated state and corresponding 
Goldstone bosons disappear. The Goldstone bosons do not exist outside 
of the systems which they organize (e.g. the magnons in the magnets, the 
phonons in the fluids and crystals and DWQ in the living matter). Hence 
it can be said that they are the physical manifestation of the metaphysical 
form of the entity. In this context it is clear that the Aristotelian notion of 
the form has nothing to do with the idea of “obscure”, invisible form that 
competes with material and efficient forces. As suggested J.A. Wheeler the 
forms are organizing different matters and they have its corresponding, 
operational modality – the physical measurable but immaterial quantity: 
the information.
G. Basti and A. Perrone have in many of their works (Basti & Perrone 
1995; 2001; 2002; Basti 2009) emphasized that the physical basis of inten-
tionality can be explained only in the terms of the long-range correlations 
that are propagated in real-time along the wide cerebral areas and which 
manifest themselves as the aperiodic chaotic oscillations. This means 
that a valid dynamical explanation for an intentional act (which always 
involves the simultaneous interaction between emotional, sensory and 
motor components of the distant cerebral parts) can be provided. On the 
other hand, the crux of the criticism of G. Basti (2008, 166–171) directed 
against C.H. Waddington consists in a critique of Waddington’s attempt to 
explain epigenetics mechanisms through the catastrophe theory originated 
with the works of R. Thom and V.I. Arnold. But this theory is absolutely 
insufficient to justify the complexity of the epigenetics dynamics of the 
livings, because the nonlinear systems studied by Arnold are characterized 
by the structural stability. But in reality, the living beings are the dissipative 
structures which stability is far from equilibrium. The discovery of these 
systems – called the chaotic systems (see below) – described by I. Prigogine 
is the key for the study of the physical basis of human intentionality in the 
cerebral dynamics. From the study of the chaotic systems and as well as 
from the study of QFT new areas of research opened up. Hence more than 
forty years of experimental research of W.J. Freeman from the University 
of California at Berkeley and his collaborators not only shared the same 
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theoretical convictions of Basti and Perrone but observed and measured this 
type of dynamic phenomena in mammalian and the human brains during 
the intentional act. The collected data of Freeman’s group found its proper 
representation in the physical-mathematical modeling in the dissipative 
QFT approach of G. Vitiello and his collaborators (Freeman & Vitiello 2006; 
2008). In brief, Freeman and his group used different techniques of brain 
imaging (EEG, ECoG, MEG) to study the background activity of the brain 
which is often filtered by neurophysiologists as a “noise” with respect to 
the synaptic activity of neurons.
By studying these data with computational tools of signal analysis to which 
physicists, differently from neurophysiologists, are acquainted, they discovered 
the massive presence of patterns of AM/FM phase-locked oscillations. They 
are intermittently present in resting and/or awake subjects, as well as in the 
same subject actively engaged in cognitive tasks requiring interaction with the 
environment. In this way, we can describe them as features of the background 
activity of brains, modulated in amplitude and/or in frequency by the “active 
engagement” of a brain with its surround. These “wave packets” extend over 
coherence domains covering much of the hemisphere in rabbits and cats (Free-
man W. J., 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2006), and regions of linear size of about 19 cm 
in human cortex (Freeman, Burke, Holmes & Vanhatalo, 2003), with near zero 
phase-dispersion (Freeman, Ga’al & Jornten, 2003). Synchronized oscillations 
of large scale neuron arrays in the β and γ ranges are observed by MEG imaging 
in the resting state and in the motor-task related states of the human brain 
(Freeman & Rogers, 2003). (Basti 2016, 30)
To sum up, as explained Basti, the “wave packets” extended over the 
coherence domains covering much of the hemisphere of observed living 
beings form a kind of “harmonious orchestra”. As a consequence, the 
intentional recognition of the input/stimulus corresponds to the estab-
lishing the coherence domain (“the melody”) in the cerebral area while 
the phase delay establishes the aperiodic chaotic regime (“the cacophony”, 
stochastic chaos). Thus, the nature of the correlations among the ele-
mentary components in living matter is based on the phase correlations 
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which is the result of the role of Goldstone bosons in the fine tuning of 
the elementary oscillations. This means that only some of the infinite 
modalities of the oscillations remain in order to being in phase, to create 
the order and so the information (Basti 2016, 25–26). But the most signif-
icant, spectacular consequences coming from the experimental research 
of Freeman and his collaborators are: 1. The transfer of information from 
the environment to the brain is not only a passive process, since the brain 
while is responding to the stimulus, is already generating the information. 
It shows that the intentional model of cognitive action is more adequate 
than the representative model. Cognition means the active process, the 
process of the continuous adequacy (ad-aequatio) of our dispositions to 
action. As a consequence of the same stimulus, different brains will give 
the different responds because they have different stories. 2. All these 
considerations have the independent evidence in the physic-mathematical 
model of QFT dissipative. In this approach the brain is considered as an 
“open”, “dissipative” system continuously interacting with the environment 
to give to this system a potentially infinite capacity of memory. From 
this model emerges the need for the doubling of the degrees of freedom 
principle that represent the environment to which the brain is coupled. 
“The environment (state) is thus represented as the time-reversed double 
of the brain (state) on which it is impinging. The environment is thus 
modeled on the brain, according to the finite set of degrees of freedom the 
environment itself elicited. Anyway, which are the available degrees of 
freedom to be elicited for that input depends on the brain itself that, for 
this reason, is effectively a self-organizing system” (Basti 2016, 31). All this 
mean that what continuously changes in the brain is not energy (matter) 
but the information. The input produces in the cerebral dynamic not the 
global variation of energy but the coherent domain (“the melody”, the 
information). This “melody”, the coherence domain which is propagated 
in the complex cerebral dynamics (“the cacophony”), is not only “in the 
head” but is located in the dynamical interface between the brain and 
the environment. As the consequence the mind is not in the head but it 
contains the brain and the whole body (Basti 2014, 243–246).
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As has already been mentioned many times one of the main causes of 
the birth of new paradigm, is called in the scientific literature of physics 
the complexity theory. From the discovery of inherent instability of dynamic 
systems in the work of H. Poincaré to the further studies on behavior and 
condition of the dynamical systems brought the unexpected results. The 
most important for discussed topic the features of these systems are (Basti 
2002, 142–174):
1. The studies of chaotic systems, that gave a rise to the complexity 
theory, can use its descriptive models to explain and unify the levels 
that were previously separated – the microscopic level (quantum 
mechanics), the mesoscopic level (thermodynamics), macroscopic 
level (classical mechanics), the megaloscopic level (general relativ-
ity). Examples of chaotic systems are presented on all these levels.
2. Although there does not exist a mathematical theory that explains 
in a satisfactory way the chaotic systems, there is the possibility to 
provide approximate mathematical theories. What can be certainly 
said is that chaotic systems are not congruous with the stochastic 
systems. It means that generally with the notion “chaotic system” 
or “deterministic chaos” one is describing the physical determinis-
tic process in which the final state depends causally on the initial 
state. But the nonlinear irreducibly nature of the equations of sys-
tem affects the exponential divergence of trajectories what gives the 
inherent unpredictability of the system’s behavior in long period of 
time. In other words, from the acquaintance of the initial conditions 
it is not possible to predict with certainty the final state.
3. The study of the dynamical instable systems and chaotic systems 
gives the opportunity to comprehend the dynamical basis of the 
dissipative structures (the Nobel Prize for I. Prigogine in 1977). 
These structures are essential to understand the physical basis of 
self-organization and self-adjustment typical for the chemical and 
biological systems. Without this research, the scientific explanation 
of richness and diversity of life or reflection on the phenomenon of 
freedom would not make any sense. Complex systems are giving the 
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objective, realistic foundation for the physical processes that are 
contingent and not determined in the way suggested by the Hume’s, 
Kant’s, and Newton’s deterministic intuitions. The KAM theorem 
showed (against the enthusiasm of Kant and Laplace) that the dy-
namical systems are generally not integrable and do not obey the 
ergodic hypothesis. But on the other hand, they include other ordi-
nated structures named chaotic attractors (strange attractors). It 
means that the dissipative structures can generate the information 
because the structure of the chaotic attractor in the chaotic behav-
ior dissipates the information of initial conditions in the process of 
divergency and generates the new information thanks to the mech-
anism of folding the divergent trajectories. Through this dynamical 
mechanism the new, totally unpredictable on the basis of the initial 
conditions structures come to existence thanks to the determinis-
tic character of laws that governs this process. This emergence of 
new order from the chaotic structure shows the strong correlation 
between the chaotic systems and the emergence of dissipative struc-
tures in nonlinear thermodynamics systems. Thus the new order not 
results from the initial conditions but from the global causality – the 
global factors that control the whole dynamic and can be known only 
after occurrence of the final state. In this context the Aristotelian 
model of causality, based on the notions of act and potency and four 
causes’ description, can be considered as more adequate to describe 
the causal relations in the ontology of chaotic systems.
To conclude in this part, the study of the logic of our minds reveals that 
it is not the logic of merely calculation but of the continuous adaptation. 
But, as it was mentioned, the shift from the representative-static paradigm 
to the intentional-dynamic was ultimately decreed by a series of cogni-
tive and neurophysiological evidence accumulated during the last years. 
Especially, chaos theory can use its descriptive models to explain and unify 
the levels of reality that were previously separated – the microscopic level 
(QM), the mesoscopic level (thermodynamics), macroscopic level (classical 
mechanics), the megaloscopic level (general relativity). The QFT can offer 
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the link between the microscopic and macroscopic phenomena and provides 
a rigorous approach to the otherwise ambiguous notion of the emergence 
of ordered structures at mesoscopic/macroscopic level.
2. New paradigm: dual ontology
The objectification of the human soul/“I” (res cogitans) led to a discussion of 
the problem in two ways: the negation of particular character of the human 
“I” (Ryle 1951), or on the other side, the attempt to justify the “I” through 
the analysis of self-consciousness (via the subjective which started with the 
thought of Saint Augustine and became widespread in modern philosophy). 
Likewise, the abandoning of the mechanistic view in contemporary biology 
and physics lead to the renovation of a dual ontology of reality – reality that 
is composed of two physical quantities: information and energy-matter. 
The spirit is then not something (brain, mind; res cogitans) inside the other 
thing (body, the set of physiological and neurophysiological functions; 
res extensa) but is the living body, the person (Basti 2014, 224–226). The 
self-evidence of consciousness, as clearly demonstrated by Thomas Aquinas 
(De Veritate X, 8; XXII, 12), is not enough to found the substantial, spiritual 
and rational nature of the human soul. Self-consciousness can only give us 
evidence of the psychical dimension, but is incapable of revealing the real 
nature of the psychical dimension (Basti 1991, 103–119). Moreover, as in 
Descartes’ and Popper’s theories, each dualistic view in which the soul has 
to displace particles would violate the first law of thermodynamics. This 
means that if the soul was the Cartesian res cogitans, the only possible 
approach would have to be a materialistic one. This assertion is a substan-
tial misunderstanding that is the fundament of contemporary discussion 
about the mind-body problem. The common characteristic of these ideas is 
the critique of Descartes’ dualism and the identification of the mind with 
something separate from the body. But many cognitive philosophers have 
moved from the representative paradigm (mind-body) to the intentional 
paradigm (person-body) (Basti 2012–2; Basti 2014, 233–234; Clark 2013).
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2.1. Against extensional reduction of the predicate being
How can it be possible to link the informational approach to Aristotelian 
ontology (Basti 2005, 173–174)? The first attempt can be found in the idea 
proposed by R. Penrose (1994, 13):
Most of the material of our bodies and brains, after all, is being continuously 
replaced, and it is just its pattern that persists. Moreover, matter itself seems 
to have merely a transient existence since it can be converted form one form 
into another. […] Thus, matter itself is nebulous and transient; and it is not at 
all unreasonable to suppose that the persistence of “self” might be have more 
to do with the preservation of patterns than of actual material particles.
The fact that our bodies are physically changed almost two times a year 
combined with the factual continuity of our “I” means that our conscious-
ness is not depending on the matter but rather upon some pattern – the 
information – that organizes matter. Moreover as in the dual ontology, 
form and always matter goes together, meaning that the informational flow 
always has to be incorporated into the energetic flow. And finally the broadly 
discussed problem of the localization of mind respectively to the body finds 
in the informational approach another solution – the mind includes the 
body. The mind is located in the informational flow of the control between 
the body’s organs and between the body and the environment. In other 
words, the flow of control contains the physical systems, hence is governing 
the body (McKay 1980, 1390). The same idea is expressed by Aristotle (De 
Anima, I, 411b) and Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, 52, 1c; 76, 8c) 
that the localization of the soul is explained in the terms of the extension 
of its power of control over the body. Consequently, the soul contains the 
body, not the other way around.
This is not the place to discuss the whole issue of the Aristotelian 
metaphysics, but it is important to consider the aspects contained in the 
scientific discipline which uses the formal methods of symbolic logic and 
the philosophical analysis – the formal ontology (Basti 2007; 2015, 80–86). 
Fundamental for it, as previously mentioned, is the distinction between 
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essence and existence. The being of the essence concept (τὸτίἦνεἶναι, τὸτίἐστι) 
literally means “the what it was to be” or “the what it is” and corresponds 
to the scholastic terms quiddity and haecceity. The being of the existence 
(common being) expresses the fact that the individual substance really exists. 
Through this distinction, medieval ontology was able to express the identity 
(the identity of the essence, quiddity) without equivalence (the identity of 
the relation between the part and the whole). But modern logic is based on 
the set theory and on the axiom of extensionality, reducing the predicate 
being to the syntactically correct use. This means to affirm in a consistent 
manner that the examined element belongs to the examined set. This 
ontological distinction implies immediately a critique of the monistic 
approach and its semantics and anthropology. The previously discussed 
distinction between intentional statements (I-talk) and observation ones 
(O-talk) showed that both are logically irreducible. This is exemplified in 
the famous example of Quine (1987, 163) who explained that the enunciate 
“I think Vienna” is not translatable into the observation enunciate of the 
determined cerebral processes correlated to the verbal act and to the rel-
ative mental state. This means that there are two different and irreducible 
logical connotations of the same denoted entity (“Vienna” in the example 
of Quine). Basti (2005, 177–178) suggests an another axiom of this ontology. 
Beside the distinction being of essence and being of existence it can be said 
that the entity (quiddity) of the denoted existing – the neurophysiological 
event – has a twofold and irreducible component: material and formal. 
This is both at the level of intentional language and its intensional logic 
and at the level of extensional language and its extensional logic. Thus, 
the neurophysiological event is not only matter but matter organized 
by the form, as we find in the Aristotelian ontology. In other words, the 
intentional statement (I-talk) has its intensional (“what I mean”) and 
extensional content (“towards what I am referring to”). But also the 
intensional content (noema) has its material and formal component. In 
Husserl’s phenomenology, noesis designates respectively the real content, 
and noema the ideal content of an intentional act (an act of consciousness). 
Noesis is always correlated with a noema. Because the noema also has its 
6(1)/2018 251
I N S E A RC H O F T H E P E R S O N. TOWA R D S A R E A L R E VO L U T I O N
twofold component the noematic sense is generally understood as the ideal 
meaning of the act and the noematic core as the act’s referent or object as 
it is meant in the act. But really important for this discussion about the 
noema’s component is the question if the noematic distinction between 
form and matter of the perception, has the real, objective fundament at 
the level of denoted existing. It can be claimed that the phenomenological 
distinction of the cognitive contents and the linguistic statements has the 
realistic basis.
This formal basis is the core of the Aristotelian ontology and means that 
each existing thing, connoted through the dual description (subjective-in-
tentional and objective-scientific) is the entity compound from matter and 
form. But in Aristotelian view, matter and form do not imply separated 
entities. As the scholastic philosophy explained, they are not ens quod but 
ens quo. They are not id quod existit (the thing that exists) but they are id 
quo aliquid existit (the medium by which something exists). In other words, 
matter and form which connote the existing object are not referred to the 
objects (or to its parts) but the relations constituting the object, that is to 
say, the essence of the considered existing entity. In brief, the Aristotelian 
ontology gives a causal explanation of essences through which the entities 
are actually existing. In other words, for Aristotle, because the matter and 
the form are id quo aliquid existit, each form is educed (comes out) from the 
potentiality of the matter. The form is not added from the outside of matter 
but because of the moving cause, arises out of matter. But educe the form 
from the matter is not the same as logically deducing the theorem from the 
premises. Aristotle in a dynamic way justifies the diversity and multiplicity 
of the entities. He uses the idea of the raw material which indicates the 
potency to take the infinite material forms. In brief, for him matter is in 
incessant movement – it is undetermined. But the forms are not hidden in 
the matter but there are potentially existing in it until the moving cause will 
be able to determine the unstable movements of the elements in the matter. 
Thus educe means to put the limit to the becoming of matter. It means to 
stabilize the chaotic movements according to the ordinated configuration 
named the disposition. For Aristotle the form (act) is always related to the 
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potency (matter), derived from the efficient, external cause and is the end, 
the determination of the incessant movement of the matter. It can be said 
that there is a structural similarity between Aristotelian physics and modern 
physics. The Aristotelian distinction between the celestial and terrestrial 
physics can be transferred into “the heart of the matter” studied by the 
quantum physics, as the physical and chemical properties of the chemical 
elements depends upon the atom’s wave configurations of electron’s mo-
tions. The atoms of the same element demonstrate a fundamental identity 
of species – the electronic wave subjects the same structural limitations as 
the atomic nucleus (Basti 2002, 343–354).
This study of the matter and the form is the core of Aristotle’s strong 
critique against all types of the monistic and materialistic philosophies. 
Not because he believed that there should be some kind of “magic force” 
(the form) which would work behind the scene, but because he based his 
physics on the physical, especially thermodynamic approach. The Aris-
totelian idea of the matter cannot be reduced to the modern idea of the 
Newtonian mass, but rather must be understood in terms of the incessant 
movement of the elements. For Stagirite, the particles that constitute 
matter have forces – the dispositions, that in his view of physics can be 
translated into thermodynamic heat. This means that the Aristotelian 
thermodynamic interpretation of the physics strengthened his conviction 
about the irreversibility of many physical processes. The essential presence 
of heat in natural processes means that they do not entail modifiable 
directions of evolution – they tend towards a new structural stability. Thus 
this point is the fundament of Aristotelian teleology. As it was mentioned 
earlier (paragraph 1.2.) the Aristotelian physical space is characterized 
by the anisotropic character, in contrast to the Newtonian dynamics and 
the isotropic character of its space. The external moving cause is able to 
induce the physical irreversible process towards a new stability. Thus the 
educed form can be defined as the intrinsic limit (act, entelécheia) and the 
irreversibility of the physical process is strictly linked with the role of the 
heat (Basti 2002, 440–446). In other words, Aristotle understood very well 
that the evolution of most of the natural processes cannot be univocally 
6(1)/2018 253
I N S E A RC H O F T H E P E R S O N. TOWA R D S A R E A L R E VO L U T I O N
predict through mere knowledge of the initial conditions. The knowledge 
of the material cause (the position of the elements) and the moving cause 
(the forces) is not sufficient in order to predict the final state, as it was 
considered in the Newtonian-Laplace approach based on the apodictic-de-
ductive method (in contrast to the mentioned hypothetical-deductive 
Aristotelian method). A sufficient knowledge would only come from the 
method of investigating the real objects:
Since ‘nature’ has two senses, the form and the matter, we must investigate its 
objects […] That is, such things are neither independent of matter nor can be 
defined in terms of matter only. […] Again, ‘that for the sake of which’, or the 
end, belongs to the same department of knowledge as the means. But the nature 
is the end or ‘that for the sake of which’. For if a thing undergoes a continuous 
change and there is a stage which is last, this stage is the end or ‘that for the 
sake of which’. (Aristotle, Physics, II, 2)
The form is the stage, the end of the continuous change, the “that for 
the sake of which”. This means that for Aristotle the formal component 
does not only mean the stable, no-predicted state of a dynamic process, 
but also the capacity (medium) of the state to achieve the stable states 
by using different paths. It would be a big misunderstanding to interpret 
the identity of Aristotelian “physical form” only in geometric, extensional 
terms. On the other hand, what in geometric terms does not make sense, 
is totally justified in the semantic-intentional. Basti (2005, 181) gives the 
example of putting food on a plate. If we are in front of the buffet and we 
are moving our hand, the circumscription of our action is defined – the 
plate and the buffet – but the trajectories marked by the movement of the 
hand are casually and geometrically not identical. On the other hand this 
chaotic dynamic of the hand from the semantic point of view is formally 
identical. On this point it is evident that the Aristotelian concept of the 
form can contribute to the contemporary discussion about living beings 
as the biological and chemical dissipative systems characterized by the 
self-organization and self-adjustment. The Aristotelian idea of the form 
corresponds to the situation described by chaos theory, the problem of 
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chaos systems which follow different and unpredictable paths and generate 
a new order – the information. The similarity of the material form to the 
mentioned chaotic attractors and the dissipative structures (paragraph 1.3.) 
is clear. As a consequence, the classical theories of information in relation to 
entropy cannot give a sufficient explanation of the complexity of biological 
and also cognitive processes.
2.2. The distinction between living and inanimate matter
The second fundamental point of Aristotelian ontology considers the 
distinction between living matter and inanimate matter. In living matter 
one can specify the difference between a formal component and aims. In 
living matter aims are in some way preexisting to the physical processes, 
because through the latter are achieved. Some of the aims can be genetically 
predetermined, although the path that the organism will choose for its 
development depends upon a huge amount of factors that are irreducible to 
the genotype. As a consequence the achievement of the phenotype cannot be 
deterministically described. In the case of the human being, intentionality 
allows man to choose in conscious way other aims different from those bio-
logically determined. This human ability give us the basis for the reflection 
about human purposes and human freedom (Basti 2013). On this point it is 
worth mentioning the Aristotelian-Thomistic idea of the sensory stimulus 
(Basti 2012–2, 553–570). As it was mentioned earlier (paragraph 1.3.) the 
classical approach attempts search to find not only psycho-logical base for 
the human intentionality but most of all searches after the psycho-physical. 
In this context is significant remember the explanation of Thomas Aquinas:
Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural 
immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according 
to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the 
thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the 
immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing 
immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby 
become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is 
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required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensible 
organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense’s action, 
all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration. But in some senses 
we find spiritual immutation only, as in “sight” while in others we find not only 
spiritual but also a natural immutation […] (Summa Theologiae, I, 78, 3).
Aquinas’s concept of immutation explains how the sensory stimulus which 
has a double component – material (energetic input) related to the sensory 
organ and spiritual (input informational) related to the sensitive faculty. 
In other words, immutatio spiritualis and immutatio materialis do not imply 
some hidden spiritual force but are rather the technical terms used to 
describe the process of the human cognition. On the one hand, they refer 
to the idea inherited from Aristotelian physics of the so called diaphaneitas. 
These were physical, transparent bodies (e.g. water, air) that were able to 
transfer different information about physical properties of real objects. In the 
contrast to the non-diaphanous objects (that could be realized, determined 
only by one form), the diaphanous bodies could virtually transfer (e.g. to 
the human eye) different information regarding the perceived object. And 
because the human eye is full of water, it can receive virtually the forms of 
the perceived objects. On the other hand, the idea of immutatio spiritualis 
is related to Aquinas’s explanation of the corporeal spirits which can be 
compared to the nervous stimulus distributed in the nerves, the brain, the 
organs and the muscles. They are the medium between the human mind and 
the body in order to perform intentional acts. But the corporal spirits are 
not considered by Thomas as the literal medium (instrument) between the 
soul and the body. They are rather, like in Aristotle, the formal dispositions 
(dispositio) of the body and its faculties. This means that in a Thomistic 
interpretation, the corporeal spirits’ dynamics effect an upward (from the 
organs, nerves to the brain) and downward (from the brain to different cor-
poreal parts) causation. This double casual direction is under the influence 
of double causality: psychological and metaphysical. The first causality 
consists in the relation between the intellectual and sensitive faculties. 
The second one consists in the relation between the soul and the body. But 
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both of these causalities are grounded on the aforementioned dispositional 
causality: upward (passive) and downward (active). Thus, the senses which 
are passively modified (upward), then on the basis of the combined sense 
they are able to effect spiritual immutation through the corporeal spirits 
(downward). Hence Thomas defined the form that is induced by immutatio 
spiritualis as “an intention of the sensible form effected in the sensible 
organ”. In other words, this form is the intentional form, because it is the 
result of the intentional act. This means that the living body is capable of 
self-organization (imminent actions) on three different levels – vegetative, 
sensorimotor and intellectual (Aquinas, S.Th. I, 18, 3; Basti 1991, 186–188, 
202–206; 2008, 214–239). This theory of perception has contemporary cor-
respondence in the studies of modern neuroscience, in that the behavior of 
neural networks can be modeled in the categories of chaos theory (stochastic 
behavior). The complex cerebral dynamics (“the cacophony” of the cerebral 
waves), the apparently chaotic activity of the brain, is transmitting precise 
signals at the cerebral macroscopic level. The Freeman’s and Rizzolatti’s 
discoveries of the neural substratum of the intentional act constitute 
a solid base for the neurophysiological correlate (but not reductionist) of 
the human intentional act. Already in the Artificial Intelligence program 
of the 1960’s focus was placed upon the idea of a distinction between the 
formal and material components of the neurophysiological event. However, 
the functionalist approach in neuroscience was insufficient to explain that 
distinction. Primarily because functionalism did not consider the complexity 
of cerebral dynamics, which are chaotic, able to not only calculate, but to 
generate information without violating the principle of the conservation 
of energy. The shift of paradigm – from the representative paradigm of 
Artificial Intelligence to the intentional one of Computational Intelligence 
– demonstrates clearly that the human person is “the energetically and 
informational opened system” (Basti 2012–2, 568–570).
To sum up, the Aristotelian ontology can offer the mind-body problem 
an adequate solution. Firstly, according to Aristotle, the form never acts upon 
matter. On the one hand, the distinction between essence and existence and, 
on the other, the distinction between the formal and agent component of 
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physical causality, allows us to study natural processes without violating the 
principle of the conservation of energy, as well as being able to consider the 
structural/informational growth. Secondly, the living body is characterized 
by its capacity to self-organization. Not only does the soul affect the body, 
but the body affects itself (immanent action). The body through its special 
parts (organs) is executing, on the different levels, the active control of its 
modification and behavior. Thirdly, the Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology 
can offer an attractive possibility to explicate philosophical problems 
in rigorous philosophical language. Especially, it would be possible to 
use the method of formal ontology. Generally, the huge potential of the 
dual approach is contained in a vision of reality totally different from the 
platonic and monistic interpretations. The fusion between the Platonism 
and monism resulted in the story of human thought, the strong conviction 
that the physical laws can be interpreted as the ideal, perfect, infinitely 
precise, immutable, unchangeable and everlasting mathematical laws that 
transcend the universe (P. Davies 2010, 71, 73). Thomas Aquinas approach, 
of course strictly immersed in Christian theological vision, together with 
ideas inherited from Aristotle, provides a causal explanation of reality, where 
not The Mind of God (ideas, ideal laws) but the First Cause (transcend and 
immanent) of the world gives an explanation of reality. Thus the numbers, 
laws, the forms exist in physical reality (are immanent to it) and only a study 
of reality, not of the pure forms, can give adequate answers for the eternal 
questions of the humanity (Basti 2012, 70–71).
Conclusion
As was shown, the progress of cognitive science is impressive. However, the 
current development can be interpreted as the change of scientific paradigm. 
From Galilean times the modern apodictic-mathematical method of science 
dominated human thought and prepared the conceptual background for 
many reductionist, fragmentary philosophical visions of reality. The Galilean 
paradigm of science was based on the assumption that the mathematico-logi-
cal hypothesis precedes observations. In other words, if we interrogate nature 
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in mathematical language, it will respond. Furthermore, its basic assumption 
claims that empirical observation is the act of measuring. Observation is 
conducted on the basis of the theory’s principles and the observation plays 
the role of verifying the truth of theory’s hypothesis. As a consequence, the 
paradigm of modern science could be characterized as the representative, 
where the theories are based on extensional logics. But as has been shown, 
it is clear that the contemporary progress of cognitive science moves from 
representative, functionalism to the intentional approach – Computational 
Intelligence, the soft-computing (Basti 2009, 210–212).
This article is the attempt to describe this shift, including the inter-
section of different disciplines: physics, biology, logic, cognitive science, 
philosophy. Obviously it would exceed the scope of this article to explain in 
detail this ongoing shift in all these disciplines. But this article has shown 
from where this shift occurred and shown in which direction the change is 
going. The ordering of dissipative structures in non-equilibrium thermody-
namics, the good theoretical framework of QFT, the study of chaotic systems, 
the cosmological and the neural interpretation of information, the use of 
modal logics and finally the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of perception 
and ontology – all these elements need a separated, systematic explication 
but even in this text it has been shown that they undoubtedly encourage 
lively dialogue between philosophy and the contemporary sciences. They 
can offer the link between the macroscopic and microscopic phenomena, 
which is important for the study of the complex cerebral activity and for the 
examination of the emergence the ordered structures from the microscopic 
level, at mesoscopic and macroscopic ones. Thus the redefinition of the 
mind-body problem to the person-body is not only wishful thinking but has 
a solid foundation. The shift, as we are seeing, has its origin in the focus 
on man’s place in the whole puzzle of the universe. In some way, the area 
of  human inquiry was limited in the past from the “macro universe” to the 
“micro universe”. But what is really fascinating is that humanity goes towards 
a real revolution. The real revolution has profound significance because it 
expresses the depth of the change within thinking. The real revolution means 
moving into the direction of unification and not isolation, which closes 
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and produces ideologies. Talking about the person in neuroscience is a real 
revolution. We are moving towards the unification that does not reduce one 
element to another but reveals the richness of life.
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